In the Taiwanese elections early this month, President Chen Shui-bian's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) became the biggest party in parliament for the first time. The party claimed that it would form a coalition with the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), which is led by former President Lee Teng-hui, to establish a stable parliamentary majority.

　　It was noteworthy that the pro-Taiwan and pro-indigenisation parties made big gains in the elections compared to parties which have views, for instance, on cross-strait ties, which are closer to those of China.

This is evident from the dismal performance of the pro-unification New Party (NP) which won only one seat. And the Kuomintang (KMT), accused by rival parties of “betraying Taiwan by working with the communists”, lost its long-time grip on the parliament.

　　The People First Party's (PFP) strategy of dissociating itself from the New Party's China policy and opposing the latter's talk of “one country, two systems”, saved it from being labelled as a “pro-China” party.

　　The DPP's plan to form a coalition with TSU means that Lee Teng-hui's indigenisation platform will get a boost. To a certain extent, the “two-states theory” has become reality.

　　As a result of Lee's strong position on the “two-states theory” and continued emphasis on the “no haste, be patient” policy, the DPP can be expected to ignore the demands of the opposition alliance. It will also be bolder in saying “no” to China on the issues of “one China”,”1992 consensus” and “one China but each side has its own interpretation of the term”.

　　Still, does it mean that Chen will take the risk to pursue independence for Taiwan? I don't think so.

　　Firstly, the discussions on cross-strait ties so far will prevent this from happening. Since taking office, Chen has pledged to uphold the four “nos” - no to a declaration of independence, referendum, constitutional changes or changes to national symbols. He has also said that the National Unification Guidelines and National Unification Council would not be abolished. Besides, he has suggested that both sides should manage the issue of “one future China” and called for “political integration” between Taipei and Beijing.

　　Hence, the DPP government is unlikely to include the “two-states theory” in the Constitution, nor is it likely to call for a referendum on creating a new nation. It is still possible for both sides to develop a “special relationship”.

　　Secondly, the DPP recently endorsed a resolution that any altering of the island's status quo must be decided through a referendum by all the residents on the island. And this resolution will take precedence over a “Taiwan Independence Article” in the party's programme which calls for a referendum on independence.

　　In effect, the party's stand is not very different from an existing view that Taiwan is already a sovereign state. This deviates from the party's traditional clamour for independence and is certain to widen the rift between its moderate and more radical members.

　　Thirdly, the combined number of seats of KMT, PFP and NP in parliament is still more than half of the total of 225 seats. They still subscribe to the “1992 consensus” and the view that there is only “one China but each side has its own interpretation of the term”. They are also inclined to reunification and will doubtless act to counter any swing in favour of an independent Taiwan.

　　Fourthly, Sino-US ties have been on the mend since the Sept 11 terrorist attacks on the US. Any attempt by Chen to seek independence is tantamount to a challenge to the US' “one China” bottom line. It is in the best interests of Washington that China does not resort to the use of force and Taiwan does not declare itself independent.

　　Lastly, China's policy of not renouncing the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue serves as a great deterrence. This is why Chen has come up with a “new middle-road” policy that stresses “national security”.

　　In short, while the pro-independence parties were victorious in the elections, what they want is really “status quo” or “de facto independence”, not an all-out pursuit for national sovereignty.

　　But we can expect Taiwan to intensify its claim that the Republic of China is a sovereign state. It will also attempt to extricate itself from the “one China framework”.

　　Beijing should come to realise that a rigid Taiwan policy will not elicit a flexible China policy from the island. Instead, it will boost the growth of pro-indigenisation parties and the emergence of more conservative policies.

(The writer is a PhD student at Taiwan's National Chengchi University. Translated by Yap Gee Poh.)

　　在本月台湾大选中，执政的民进党首度成为国会最大多数党，陈水扁总统并宣称将与前总统李登辉领导的台湾团结联盟合作结盟，组成稳定的国会多数。

　　此次选举有一重要特色，即标榜台湾主体性、台湾优先的本土性政治势力取得相对多数；并且任何政党与中国在意识形态或两岸政策观点、关系过于亲近接触者，在选举时易受敌对政党以族群动员所排挤或“污名化”，例如新党的泡沫化及国民党被影射为“联共卖台”。

　　至于亲民党则在中国政策上策略性地与新党区隔开，反对新党候选人提出“一国两制”之说，使其免于遭受敌对政党对其“亲中”的定性。

　　由于民进党宣称将与台联结盟，这使得李登辉的本土化路线得以在日后仍持续发展，“两国论路线”在某种程度上获得实践。

　　可预料的是，李登辉对于“两国论路线”的坚持及在某种程度仍强调“戒急用忍”政策的延续，将使民进党政府在“一个中国原则”、“九二共识”或“一个中国、各自表述”更倾向于采取强硬的态度拒绝在野联盟的要求，更敢向中国说“不”。

　　尽管如此，这是否便意味陈水扁会铤而走险进一步公开追求台湾法理主权的独立？笔者认为尚不至于如此。

　　第一，既往的两岸政策论述将限制此种可能性发展。陈水扁就任以来曾提出“四不一没有”政策、“两岸共同处理未来一个中国问题”及“政治统合论”。这便意味着台湾当局不会将“两国论”入宪，不存在公投建国的可能性，两岸仍有可能建构一种“特殊关系”。

　　第二，其实民进党本身并非“纯粹的台独党”，日前通过《台湾前途决议文》的位阶等同于《公投台独党纲》，且依“新法优先旧法”原则，若两者发生抵触，《台湾前途决议文》 效力将优先于《公投台独党纲》。

　　这标志着该党对台湾主权的论述，其概念与中华民国是一个主权独立国家概念几乎相同 ，把台湾中华民国化的作法，更是挑战传统台独论述，扩大党内主流意识与基本教义派间的分歧。

　　第三，整个泛蓝阵营在国会席次仍是多数过半，国民党、亲民党及新党仍坚持“一个中国，各自表述”、“九二共识”及倾向统一的坚定立场，无疑地这将进一步制约新中间路线往独的方向摆荡。

　　第四，美中关系自九一一恐怖攻击事件后已大为改善，如果陈水扁公然追求法理上独立等于挑战美国“一个中国”底线；“中国不武、台湾不独”最符合美国的国家利益。

　　第五，目前中国对台政策仍“不承诺放弃以武力解决台湾问题”，这对台湾追求法理独立产生巨大吓阻作用，也是为什么新中间路线需要标榜以“维护国家安全”为核心目标的意义。

　　综上所论，尽管此次大选具本土性色彩、较主张独立的政党取得相对多数，但他们所追求的仍是强调“维持现状即是独立”的“实质独立”，而非公然追求法理主权的独立。

　　可想而知的是，台湾当局将会强化中华民国是一个主权独国家的论述，同时会试图将中华民国从“一个中国架构”脱钩出来。

　　面对台湾与中华民国重合，中国政府当局应理解僵化的对台政策不仅无法解开松绑台湾的中国政策，反而更助长以台湾优先为号召的政党发展及具保守性政策的产生。

·作者是台湾政治大学博士生

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